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Various declassified documents from USA's CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) released under the project Chile Declassification Project, where intelligence etc. concerning Chilean matters and matters concerning Pinochet were published.
The declassification of the documents was a concequence of the case against Pinochet in London from 1998 to 2000 when Spanish authorities requested documentation from the USA as evidence against Pinochet. It resulted in a general publification og certain documents during president Bill Clinton's (b. 1946) time in office. The declassified documents under the Chile Declassification Projekt as a whole and the ones rendered here in particular cannot be seen as a complete or for that matter representative sample of what really exists of documentation concerning the matters from the side of the US. Documents that to too much of a degree were estimated to reveal too much of the US intelligence agencies's methods of work or in other ways could have harmed US national interests were not declassified. Of similar reasons there are some blackened out parts of these documents. These black outs are represented on this page.
This is an "Intelligence Information Report" from the Directorate Of Operations, a then branch of the CIA. It contains information and a critical evaluation of Orlando Letelier (1932-1976), who at the time of this report had just been named Chilean ambassador to the USA. It was declassified and approved for release in July of 2000.
Intelligence information Report
DATE DISTR. 5 MAR 1971
Ambassador Letelier THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
4. Orlando Letelier. the new ambassador to the US, was an economist with the Inter-American Bank. He owes his important appointment entirely to his colse personal friendship with Allende. There were objections on the part of some high ranking party members but Allende prevailed for his friend. This may be the first step towards making the Chilean Embassey in Washington into a classic communist style operation - with the Ambassador simply the figurehead and with true control resting with the subordinate sraff member
This is a telegram concerning a dinner with Pinochet in 1971 at a time when he was commander in chief at the army base in the capital, Santiago. It contains an assesment of Pinochet's political standpoints and his inclination to stage a coup against the Allende government. It was declassified in July of 2000. CLASSIFIED TELEGRAM 1. At dinner 5 August general Augusto Pinochet Ugarte avoided making political comments which would reveal his inner thoughts. This completely consistent with his known pattern: He is cautious and quiet on political subjets. Nevertheless his wife seconded comment by other guests to effect that government was getting in deep water with its present orientation. Moreover subject is close to family of Luis Molina Urete into which his son has married (Pinochet son married daughter of Molina). Molina is National Party member who told privately that if govt continues on present course he may try push Pinochet to effect coup. While remark was self-seeking, it not likely he would have made it if he felt Pinochet were completely loyal to regime. 2. Pinochet arrived late, having been closeted with president Allende earlier, during evening he was called to phone half dozen times to get reports on situation in city, status of PDC meeting downtown, etc. It was quite clear that as Jefe de la Plaze he is not ceremonial figure. Pinochet appeared to be mild, friendly, narrow-guaged military man who totally immersed in new field of security, public order and political events and who clearly enjoyed feeling of being important. 3. . 4. In connection with does not consider Pinchet to be pro-PDC or to be beholden to PDC. According to , Comite Revolcionario assesses subject as person who could possibly be neutralized by conspiratorial group but who would not lead any coup. 6.
This telegram is written on the background of talk with Pinochet in September 1972 and bears witness on Pinochet's loyalty towards the Unidad Popular-government and towards Salvador Allende, on the army stand all together and Pinochet's and the army's relation to the U.S. army. The document was declassified on June 11th of 1999. 27 SEP 72 1. gave following impression: Situation very bad with Allende imcapable of maintaining control of running govt. No coup plans afoot, but all believe overthrow attempt can develop soon. Young officers particular discontented with high command compliance with Allende policies. 2. Pinochet, previously the strict constituionalist, reluctantly admitted he now harboring second thoughts: that Allende must be forced to step down or be eliminated ("only alternatives"). Pinochet (who Prat man) believes Prats leading candidate to head new govt but admits that if coup is led by younger officers (far out possibility), Prats won't have chance because he too closely identified with Allende. 3. Allende continues to pressure high command to buy Soviet military equipment, but senior officers resisting successfully. Army does not want new line of weapons nor presence of soviet advisers of technicians. Most army willing acept would be anti-aircraft weapons of veneral logistic items. Pinochet was in Panama before coming Mexico to negotiate purchase of tanks from U.S. govt. He felt he was very well treated and came away believing U.S. will supply tanks after all. (While in Panama, talked with more junior U.S. Army officers he knew from days at School of Americas and was told U.S. will support coup aganist Allende "with whatever means necessary" when time comes.)
This is an "Information Report" from the Directorate Of Operations, a then branch of the CIA. It contains information and comments on reports that a coup allegedly scedueled for September 10th allegedly is postponed for the following day, September 11th. It was approved for release on June 11th 1999.
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
DIST 10 SEPTEMBER 1973
1. THAT A COUP ATTEMPT WILL BE INITIATED ON 11 SEPTEMBER. ALL THREE BRANCHES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE CARABINEROS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION. A DECLARATION WILL BE READ ON RADIO AGICULTURA AT 7 A.M. ON 11 SEPTEMBER THAT THE CARABINEROS HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEIZING PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE. 2. COMMENT: THE COUP SCHEDUELED FOR 10 SEPTEMBER HAD BEEN POSTPONED, AND 3. COMMENT: WHILE IT MAY BE THAT THE ARMED FORCES POSTPONED THE COUP SCHEDUELED FOR 10 SEPTEMBER IN ORDER TO IMPROVE TACTICAL COORDINATION, AND WHILE THE NAVY APPEARS FIRM IN ITS RESOLVE TO OUST ALLENDE, IS HAS TO BE ASSUMED THAT THE PRESIDENT IS STILL WORKING DILIGENTLY TO DEFLATE THIS CIRSIS: IN THIS REGARD HE HAS SCHEDUELED A NATIONAL ADDRESS FOR THE AFTERNOON OF 10 SEPTEMBER, THE PRESIDENT COULD USE THIS OCCASION TO ANNOUNCE SOME DRAMATIC PROPOSAL SUCH AS THE CALLING OF A PLEBECITE WHICH COULD AGAIN CAUSE THE PLOTTERS TO HESITATE). 4.
This is an "Intelligence Information Report" from the Directorate Of Operations, a then branch of the CIA. It contains information on former army general Roberto Viaux Marambio (1917-2005) and his conditions and activities eemediately after the coup of Septermber 11th 1973. It was declassified and approved for release in June of 1999.
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
DISTR. 17 OCTOBER 1973
1. SHORTLY AFTER THE OVERTHROW OF PRESIDENT SALVADOR A L L E N D E, GENERAL ROBERTO V i A U X MARAMBIO, WHO IS IN EXILE IN PARAGUAY, "> TO INQUIRE INTO HIS PERSONAL SITUATION AND TO FIND OUT ABOUT QUASHING THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT MARTIAL WHICH HAD CONDEMNED GENERAL VIAUX TO FIVE YEARS IN EXILE. VIAUX SAID HE WISHED TO RETURN TO CHILE NOW. 2. VIAUX WAS TOLD THAT AN AMNESTY LAW COULD PROVIDE FOR HIS RETURN, BUT THAT FOR THE TIME BEING, IT WOULD NOT BE WISE FOR HIM TO RETURN SINCE HIS SAFETY WOULD BE IN QUESTION. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT SEVERAL METHODS FOR SOLVING HIS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS WERE BEING CONSIDERED, ONE OF THEM BEING HIS POSSIBLE APPOIMIENT AS AMBASSADOR TO PARAGUAY. C0MMENT: JOSE VALDES FIGUEROA, THE FORMER AMBASSADOR, RESIGNED THE DAY FOLLOWING THE COUP, WITH HIS DISMISSAL BY THE JUNTA FOLLOWING AFTER-THE-FACT. VALDES PLANS TO REMAIN IN PARAGUAY.) ( COMMENT: THE FORMER MINISTER OF ECONOMY, GENERAL ROLANDO G 0 N Z A L E Z, HAS BEEN NAMED AMBASSADOR TO PARAGUAY.) 3.
4.
This note os on an armed clash and other incidents with government forces and MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria) in Chile, and was declassified on June 11th 1999. STAFF NOTES: Latin American Trends Chile: MIR on the Run The military government is maintaining the upper hand in its campaign aganist the extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Still reeling 'from the death of Miguel Enriquez last month, the MIR has been dealt several additional blows by government security forces .. Claudio Rodriquez, the group's deputy intelligence chief, was killed on Saturday after he threw a grenade at officers attempting to arrest him. Another alleged MIR leader, Felipe Flores, was captured after a separate armed clash the same day. On Monday, the government arrested Laura Allende de Pascal. Senora Pascal, the late president Allende's sister and the mother of fugitive MIR leader Andres Pascal Allende, had not previously been sought by the security forces and was not in hiding. however tend to support government claims that she was involved in MIR activities. particularly zealous security officers--perhaps members of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA)--may have been responsible for a grisly bit of psychological warfare against the MIR early Sunday morning. The body of at young female MIR member was thrown into the Italian Embassy residence compound, where nearly 300 leftists, including maby MIR members, have sought asylum. The current round of government successes is partly the result of a bank robbery that took place in early October for which the MIR, ironically, may not even have been responsible. The events leading to Enriquez's death began when security officers searching for the bank robbers recognized another MIR leader in a passing automobile. Documents found on Enriquez have provided omportant leads to various MIR members and activities. There are indications that Enriquez had decided to launch a MIR offensive, but DINA director Colonel Jose Contreras's told high government officials that Enriquez was not involved in the bank robbery. The government publicly claimed that 15 million escudos found in the house where he died was loot from the bank, however, and later blamed the robbery on an alleged MIR segment called the Armed Revolutionary VAngard. (VAR). Carabinero and Departmebt of Investigations officers do not believe that the VAR has ever been connected with the MIR. The police have arrested VAR leader Nelson Aramburu and recovered 28 million of the 37 million stolen escudos from his mother's house. They believe the VAR is nothing more than one of a number of small bands for their crimes when Allende was in power. Whether or not the VAR was an authentic MIR splinter group remains unclear. It is apparent, howeger, that the mIR is on the run and that security forces have good mental pictures of the fugitives. Claudio Rodriguez met his end after he was recognized by an off duty officer while both men were shopping in a middle-class residential-area supermarket.
This brief biographical text on Pinochet is a confidential document dated Apirl 28th 1976. It was declassified on June 11th of 1999. It has a caracteristic of Pinochet and an assessment of his caracter. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (Phonetic: peenohCHAY) President, Commander in Chief of the Army Addressed as: Mr. President Army Commander since August 1973, Maj. Gen. Augusto Pinochet, 60, became President after he led the September 1973 coup against President (1970-1973) Salvador Allende. Pinochet is totally dedicated to the establishment in Chile of a new political and economic order free of all vestiges of Marxism. Hed dislikes politicians of all persuasions and blames them for the problems that necessitated the coup. The President will not tolerate any oppositon to the government or to its goal Of national reconstruction. Pinochet has a concern for people, and his frequent public appearences throughout Chile have at times given him the semblance of a grassroots politician. He is genuinle popular in Chile despite severe personal critisism from abroad. the President admires the United States, byt he has been unhappy at the attempts in Congress to stop the flow of US military aid to Chile. He has been to the United States at least three times. Generally considered tough, rigid and disciplined, Pinochet has been described as warm and friendly by journalists who have interviewed him. He does nog smoke but drinks in moderation. He enjoys reading and writing. He has written at least three books on geography, one of which has been udes as a high school text. Married to the former Lucía Hiriart, the President has five children and seven grand-children. He speaks some French and a little English.
This is a Department of State memorandum from a meeting between US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, Augusto Pinochet and other on Pinochet's office in Santiago during the OAS (Organization of American States) meeting in Santiago in June 1976. It is a transscript of the conversation and shows the thoughts on national security policy on the part of both Pinochet and Kissinger and their judgements of their options in that regard. The document was declassified on October 20th 1998. Department of State Date: June 8, 1976 Time: 12:00 noon Place: Santiago, Chile (President Pinochet's office) Emne: U.S.-Chilean Relations Participants: CHILE Augusto Pinochet, president Patricio Carvajal, Foreign Minister Manuel Trucco, Ambassador to United States Ricardo Claro, OAS/GA Conference Coordinator for Chilean Government United States The Secretary William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Anthony Hervas (Interpreter) The Secretary: This is a beautiful building. The conference is well organized. Are you meeting with all the delegations? Pinochet: Yes. Two og three a day. I want to tell you we are grateful that yau have come to the conference. The Secretary: It is an honor. I was touched by the popular reception when I arrived. I have a strong feeling of friendship in Chile. Pinochet: This is a country of warm-hearted people, who love liberty. This is the reason they did not accept Communism when the Communists attempted to take over the country. Is is a long term struggle we are part of. It is a further stage of the same conflict which erupted into the Spanixh Civil War. And we note the fact that though the Spaniards tried to stop Communism 40 years ago, is is springing up again in Spain. The Secretary: We had the Spanish King recently, and I discussed that very issue with him. Pinochet: I have always been against Communism. during the Viet-Nam War, I met with some of your military and made clear th thom my anti-Communism, and told them I hoped they could bring about its defeat. The Secretary: In Vietnam we defeated ourselves through our internal divisions. There is a world-side propaganda campaign by the communists. Pinochet: Chile is suffering from that propagande effort. Unfortunately, we do not have the millions needede to counter propaganda. The Secretary: I must say your spokesman (Sergio Diez) was very effictive in this morning's General Assembly session in explaining your position. In the United States, as you konw, we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do here. I think that the previous government was headed toward Communism. We wish yor government well. At the same time, we face massive domestic problems, in all branches ofthe government, sepecially Congress, but also in the Executive, over the issue of jumna rights. As you know, Congress is now debating further restraints on aid to Chile. We are opposed. But basically we don't want to intervene in your domestic affairs. We can't be precise in our proposals about what you should do. But this is a problem which complicates our relationships and the efforts of those who are friends of Chile. I am going to speak about human rights this afternoon in the General Assembly. I delayed my statement until I could talk to you. I wanted you to understand my position. We want to deal in moral persuasion, not by legal sanctions. Is is for this reason that we oppose the Kennedy Amendment. In my statement, I will treat human rights in general terms, and human rights in a world context. I will refer in two paragraphs to the report on Chile of the OAS Human Rights Commission. I will say that the human rights issue has impaired relations between the U.S. and Chile. This is partly the result of Congressional actions. I will add that I hope you will shortly remove those obstacles. I will also call attention the the Cuba report and to the hypocrisy of some who call attention to human rights as a means of intervening in governments. I can do no less, without producing a reaction in the U.S. which would lead to legislative restrictions. The speech is not aimed at Chile. I wanted to tell you you about this. My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world, and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going Communist. But we have a practical problem we have to take into account, without bringing about pressures incompatible with your dignity, and at the same time which does not lead to U.S. laws which will undermine our relationship. It would really help our relationship if you would let us know the measures you are taking in the human rights field. None of this is said with the hope of undermining your government. i want you to succeed and I want to retain the possibility of aid. If we defeat the Kennedy amendment, I don't know if you listen in on my phone, but if you do you have just heard mi issue instructions to Washington to make an all-out effort to do just that – if we defeat it, we will deliver the F-5E's as we agreed to do. We held up for a while in others to avoid providing additional ammunition to our enemies. Pinochet: We are returning to institutionalism step by step. But we are constantly being attacked by the Christian Democratics. They have a strong voice in Washington. Not the people in the Pentagon, but they do get through to Congress. Gabriel Valdez has access. Also Letelier. The Secretary: I have not seen a Christian Democrat for years. Pinochet: Also Tomic and others I don't recall. Letelier has access to the Congress. We know they are giving false information. You see, we have no experience in government. We are worried about our image. In a few days we will publish tne constitutional article on human rights, and also another setting op the Council of State. Ther eare a number of efforts we are making to move to institutionalization. In the economic area, we have paid our debts, after the renegotiation. We are paying $700 million in debts with interest this year. We have made land feforms. And we are taking other constitutional measures. WE have freed most detained prisoners. There have been 60 more just recently. In September 11. 1974, I challenged the Soviets to set free their prisoners. But they haven't done so, while we have only 400 repole who are now detained. On international relations, we are doing well. In the case of Bolivia, we have extended our good will. It alle depends now no Peru. The Secretary: I have the impression that Peru is not very sympathetic. Pinochet: You are right. Peru does not wish to see the idea proposed. The Secretary: Peru told me they would get no port out of the arrangement. Pinochet: Peru is arming. Peru is trying to buy a carrier from the British for $160 million. It is also building four torpedo boats in Europe. Peru is breaking the arms balance in the South Pacific. It has 600 tanks from the Soviet Union. We are doing what we can to sustain ourselves in case of an emergency. The Secretary: Whare are you doing? Pinochet: We are largely modifying old armaments, fixing junked units. We are a people with energy. We have no Indians. The Secretary: I gather Chile generally wins its wars. Pinochet: We have never lost a war. We are a proud people. On the human right front, we are slowly making progress. We are now down to 400. We have freed more. And we are also changing some sentences so that the prisoners can be elegible for leaving. The Secretary: If you could group the releases, instead of 20 a week, have a bigger program of feleases, that would be better for the psychological impact of the releases. What I mean is not that you should delay, but that you should group the releases. Byt to return th the military aid question, I really don't konw how it will go tomorrow in the Senate. Trucco: the Buchanan amendment is workable. The Secretary: I repeat that if the House version succeeds, then we will send the planes. Trucco: (Discusses the technical aspects of the 1975, 1976 and 1977 legislation.) Trucco: The problem is now in the Senate, for the FY 1977 bill. Fraser has already had his amendment passed by the House. The Secretary: I understand. WE have our position on that. My statement and our position are designed to allow us to say to the congrass that we are talking to the Chilean government and therefore Congress need not act. We had the choice whether I should come or not. We thought it better for Chile if I came. My statement is not offensive to Chile. Ninety-five percent of what I say is appoicable to all the governments fo the Hemisphere. It includes things your own people have said. Trucco: That's true. We are strongly in favor of strenghtening the OAS Commission. The Secretary: We are not asking the OAS to andorse anything. I have talked with other delegations. We want an outcome which is not deeply embarrssing to you. Byt as friends, I must tell you that we face a situation in the United States where we must be able to point to events here in Chile, or we will be defeated. As Angola demonstrates, Congress is in a mood of destructiveness. We were in a good position in Angole. We thought Angola could become the Viet-Nam of Cuba. this would have occurred if Cuba had begun to sustain 20 casualties a week. Cuba could not have stood that for long. We had the forces for that. Congress stopped us. But I am persuaded that the Executive, whoever is elected, will be stronger after the election. Pinochet: How does the US see the problem between Chile and Peru? The Secretary: (after a pause.) We would not like to see a conflict. Much depends on who begins it. Pinochet: The question is really to prevent the beginning. The Secretary: the American people would ask who is advancing on whom. Pinochet: But you know what's going on here. You see it with your satellites. The Secretary: Well, I can assure you that if you take Lima, you will have little U.S. support. Pinochet: We did it once, a hundred years ago. It would be difficult now, in view of the present balance of forces. The Secretary: If Peru attacked, this would be a serious matter for a country armed with Soviet equipment. It would be serious. Clearly we would opose it diplomatically. But it all depends, beyond that. It is not easy to generate support for U.S. military action these days. Pinochet: We must fight wityh our own arms? The Secretary: I distinguish between preferences and probabilities. it depends how it happens. If there is naked aggression, that means greater, more general resistance. Pinochet: Assume the worst, that is to say, that Chile is the aggressor. Peru defends itself, and than attacks us. What happens? The Secretary: It is not that easy. We will know who the aggressor is. If you are not the aggressor, than you will have support. But aggression does not resolve international disputes. One side can stage an incident. But generally we will know who the aggressor is. Carvajal: In the case of Bolivia, if we give Bolivia some territory, Bolivian territory might be guaranteed by the American states. The Secretary: I have supported Bolivia in its aspirations to the sea, but de la Flor is not happy about it. Carvajal: I we gave some territory to Bolivia, and then permitted Peru to the use of the port, Peru would get everything it needs. The Secretary: It is my feeling Peru will not accept. Pinochet: I am concerned very much by the Peruvian situation. Circumstances might produce aggression by Peru. Why are they buying tanks? They have heavy artillery, 155's. Peru is more inclined to Russia that the U.S. Russia supports theis people 100%. We are behind you. You are the leader. But you have a punitive system for your friends. The Secretary: ther is merit in what you say. It is a curious time in the U.S. Pinochet: We solved the problem of the large transnational enterprises. We renegotiated the expropriations, and demonstrated our good faith by making prompt payments on the indebtedness. The Secretary: It is unfortunate. We have been through Viet-Nam and Watergate. We have to wait until the elections. We welcomed the overthrow of the Communist-inclined government here. We are not out to weaken your position. On foreign aggression, is would be a grave situation if one were attacked. That would constitute a direct threat to the inter-American system. Carvajal: There is a massive Cuban influence in Peru. Many Cubans are there. The Peruvians may be pushed. And what happens to the thousands of Cuban soldiers now in Africa, when they are no linger needeed there. The Secretary: If there are Cuban troops involved in a Peruvian attack, than the problem is easy. We will not permit a Cuban militaryforce of 5,000 Cubans in Peru. Carvajal: They now have a system, where the Peruvians enter in groups of 20, but the Peruvian registry registers only 1. The Secretary: The Cubans are not good soldiers. Carvajal: But there is the danger of irresponsible attack. Claro: I have sources in Peru. There is, I am told, a real chance that Cuba could airlift troops to Peru. The Secretary: This would change the situation, and the question then is easy. We will not permit Cuba another military adventure. A war between Peru and Chile would be a cmoplex thing, but a war between Cuba and Chile or others, we would not be indifferent. Claro: Your planners were down here in 1974. They did not believe that there was a Cuba threat. The Soviets use Cuba for aggression, I argued. Angola has since confirmed this. The Secretary: We will not tolerate another Cuban military move. After the election, we will have massive trouble if they are not out of Angola. Secondly, I also feel stronger that we can't accept coexistence and ideological subversion. We have the conditions now for a more realistic policy. It would help you if you had some human rights progress, which could be announced in packages. The most important are the constitutional guarantees. The precise number of prisoners is subordinate. Right to habeas corpus is also important. And if you could give us advanced information of your human rights efforts, we could use this. As to the Christian Democrats, we are not using them. I haven't seen one since 1969. We want to remove the weapons in the arms of our enemies. Itis a phenomenon that we deal with special severity with out friends. I wans th see our relations and friendship improve. I encouraged the OAS to have its General Assembly here. I knew it would add prestige to Chile. I came for that reason. We have suggestions. We want to help, not undermine you. You did a great service to the West in everthrowing Allende. Otherwise Chile would have followed Cuba. then there would have been no human rights of Human Rights Commission. Trucco: We provided the General Assembley the answers to some of the Secretary's suggestions. What will be missing will be our explanation of the coming constitutional acts. The Secretary: Can you do those while the OAS is here? Pinochet: We have wante to avoid doing anything while the OAS is here, since it then looks as though we did it to dampen OAS pressure. We might be able to in 30 days. The Secretary: If we can, we are prepared to say we have the impression that the constitutional act is helpful. Pinochet: I discussed it in my inaugural speech.
This memorandum to Ronald Reagan is a source to reflections on US policy towards Chile. It was declassified in September 1987. [...] [Coming soon] [...]
This short biographical text from the DIA is included here to very concretely display the gaps in the material published under the Chile Declassification Projekt, from where the texts on this page come. (U) Name General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (pee-noh-CHET), the Chilean Army. (U) Position: President and chief of the military junta since September 12th 1973, and Commander in Chief of the Army since August 24th 1973.
This short text from the DCI is a brief report and comment on Pinochet's speech at the 10th anniversary of the coup on September 11th 1973. National Intelligence Daily Monday 12 September 1983 CHILE: Anniversary Speech President Pinochet's nonconfrontational 10th anniversary speech yesterday and the moderate level of violence through the weekend probably will permit renewed talks between the government and the democratic oppositon. Pinochet defended the timetable included in the constitution of 1980 that calls for restoring civilian rule in 1989, but he confirmed the possibility of an amendment that would allow election of af congress before then. He also ackonwledged that interior Minister Jarpa would continue the dialogue with the opposition Democratic Alliance. Most of the violence, which press reports indicate han left about nine dead, occurred in the slums of Santiago. Copperworkers union chief Rodolfo Seguel was jailed, but no other prominent opposition figures were arrested.
Comment: The government, which refrained from calling on the military to handle security, and the democratic oppostition will both gain credibility for having held down violence. Nevertheless, the jailing of Seguel and Communist plans for cintinued violence earry the potential to delay or disrupt resumption of talks on a democratic opening.
This memorandum to Ronald Reagan is a source to CIA's assessment on the real prospects to a transition to democracy in Chile on one hand, and to their assessment on Pinochet's attitude towards this transition on the other hand. MEMORANDUM TO: The President [Ronald Reagan] [...] [Coming soon] [...]
This is a document dated November 18th 1988 with accounts on events on the evening of the October 5th 1988 plebicite for or against 8 more years under pinochet's rule, that had turned out 54 % against and 43 % for. 18 NOV 88 1. 2.
OCTOBER 1988. COMMENTED ON EVENTS OF THE EVENING OF THE 5 OCTOBER PLEBISCITE. HE LEARNED DURING THE DAY THAT PRESIDENT AUGUSTO ((PINOCHET)) UGARTE, ARMY VICE COMMANDER GENERAL SANTIAGO ((SINCLAIR)) OYANEDER, INTERIOR MINISTER SERGIO ((FERNANDEZ)) FERNANDEZ, INTERIOR SUBSECRETARY ALBERTO ((CARDEMIL)) HERRERA, AND MINISTER SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT ORLANDO ((POBLETE)) ITURRATE HAD A PLAN IN WHICH THE INTERIOR MINISTRY WOULD DELAY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF VOTING RESULTS TO AGITATE THE OPPOSITION, ANNOUNCE PRELIMINARY RESULTS FAVORABLE TO THE "YES" VOTE, AND THEN 'CALL THE "YES" VOTERS TO THE STREETS TO CELEBRATE THE ALLEGED "YES" VICTORY: THIS WOULD THEN RESULT IN A STRONG OPPOSITION REACTION, STREET CLASHES AND THE NEED TO CALL IN TME ARMY TO RESTORE ORDER; THEREBY PROVIDING A HANDY EXCUSE TO SUSPEND THE PLEBISCITE. STATED THAT THIS IDEA WAS BLOCKED BY THEN SANTIAGO GARRISON COMMANDER BRIGADIER GENERAL JORGE ((ZINCKE)) QUIR0Z, WHO REFUSED TO PERMIT ANY DEMONSTRATIONS, INCLUDING MAKING AN EXCEPTION FOR A "YES" MARCH. REMARKED THAT IT WAS CLEAR BY LATE AFTERNOON THAT THE “NO” VOTE WOULD WIN AND HE PRESSURED THE INTERIOR MINISTER TO STOP PLAYING GAMES AND NOT FURTHER DELAY ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OF VOTING STATISTICS AT PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED TIMES. STATED THAT HE ALSO MADE-IT CLEAR THAT WOULD NOT GO ALONG WITH ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE LEGAL PROCEDURES FOR THE PLEBICITE CALLED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION.
this report is a source to the question on how close the election result of October 5th really was to being overturned. [...] [Coming soon] [...] |
